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ABSTRACT 
The route optimization operation in Mobile IP Version 6 (MIPv6) 
allows direct routing from any correspondent node to any mobile 
node and thus eliminates the problem of “triangle routing” present 
in the base Mobile IP Version 4 (MIPv4) protocol. Route 
optimization, however, requires that a mobile node constantly 
inform its correspondent nodes about its new care-of addresses by 
sending them binding update messages. Unauthenticated or 
malicious binding updates open the door for intruders to perform 
redirect attacks, i.e., malicious acts which redirect traffic from 
correspondent nodes to locations chosen by intruders. How to 
protect binding update messages to defend against redirect attacks 
is a challenging problem given the open environment in which 
MIPv6 operates. In this paper, we first look at two solutions 
proposed by the IETF Mobile IP Working Group and point out 
their weaknesses. We then present a new protocol for securing 
binding update messages. We also show that our protocol 
achieves strong security and at the same time is highly scalable to 
wide spread deployment. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.3.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General – 
security and protection. 
General Terms 
Design, Security. 
Keywords 
Authenticated key-exchange, mobile IP, mobile IP security, 
redirect attack, secure binding update. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile networking technologies, along with the proliferation of 
numerous portable and wireless devices, promise to change 
people’s perceptions of the Internet. In mobile networking, 
communications activities are not disrupted when a user changes 
his/her device’s point of attachment to the Internet - all the 
network reconnections occur automatically and transparently to 
the user. 
In today’s Internet, the Internet Protocol (IP) routes packets from 
source to destination according to the subnet prefix derived from 
the destination IP address by masking off some of the low-order 
bits. Thus, an IP address typically carries with it information that 
specifies the IP node’s point of attachment to the Internet. As a 
mobile node roams in the Internet, it needs to change its IP 
address every time it moves to a new location. On the other hand, 
however, to maintain existing transport-layer connections as a 
mobile node moves from one place to another, it must keep its IP 
address the same, changing the IP address will cause the existing 
transport layer connections to be disrupted and lost. 
The above dilemma is solved in Mobile IP (MIP) by allowing a 
mobile node to be addressed by two IP addresses, a home address 
and a care-of address. The former is an IP address assigned to the 
mobile node within its subnet prefix on its home link and the 
latter is a temporary address acquired by the mobile node while 
visiting a foreign link. The dual address mechanism in MIP allows 
packets to be routed to the mobile node regardless of its current 
point of attachment and the movement of the mobile node away 
from its home link is transparent to transport and higher-layer 
protocols. MIP version 4 (MIPv4) was specified in [1] and the 
most recent specification for MIP version 6 (MIPv6) was 
published by the IETF Mobile IP Working Group in [2]. Mobility 
support in IPv6 is considered particularly important, since mobile 
devices are predicted to account for a significant fraction of the 
population of the Internet during the lifetime of IPv6. 
MIPv6 shares many features with MIPv4 but there are several 
major differences. Among them is the support for “Route 
Optimization” as a built-in fundamental part of the MIPv6 
protocol, rather than an after-thought being added as an optional 
extension that may not be supported by all the nodes as in MIPv4. 
The integration of route optimization functionality allows direct 
routing from any correspondent node to any mobile node, without 
needing to pass through the mobile node’s home link and be 
forwarded by its home agent, and thus eliminates the problem of 
“triangle routing” present in MIPv4. 
Route optimization in MIPv6 requires that the mobile node, its 
home agent and the correspondent node maintain a Binding 
Cache. A binding is the association of a mobile node’s home 
address with a care-of address for that mobile node, along with 
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the remaining lifetime of that association. A mobile node uses 
binding update messages to notify its correspondent node or its 
home agent of its current binding. Unfortunately, unauthenticated 
binding update messages provide intruders an easy means to 
launch “Redirect Attacks”, i.e., malicious acts which redirect 
traffic from correspondent nodes to destinations chosen by 
intruders. Therefore, security of the binding update messages is of 
paramount importance for MIPv6 to meet its basic security 
requirements. An earlier IETF draft on MIPv6 was returned by the 
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) to the Mobile IP 
Working Group due to concerns about the security and scalability 
of binding update messages [3]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
give a short overview of the operations in MIPv6, with emphasis 
on route optimization and binding update operations. We also 
detail the types of redirect attacks and state the security 
assumptions in MIPv6. In Section 3, we review two solutions 
proposed by the IETF Mobile IP Working Group for protecting 
binding update messages against redirect attacks and point out 
their security limitations. Section 4 is devoted to our new protocol 
and its analysis. Finally, Section 5 contains our concluding 
remarks.  
2. OPERATION, REDIRECT ATTACKS 
AND SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS IN 
MOBILE IPV6 
2.1 Mobile IPv6 Basic Operation 
In MIPv6 [2], every mobile node has a home address, an IP 
address assigned to a mobile node within its home link. A mobile 
node is always addressable by its home address, whether it is 
currently attached to its home link or is away from home. While a 
mobile node is at home, packets addressed to its home address are 
routed using the normal IPv6 routing mechanisms in the same 
way as if the node were never mobile. Since the subnet prefix of a 
mobile node’s home address is the subnet prefix of its home link, 
packets addressed to it will be routed to its home link. 
While a mobile node is away from home and attached to some 
foreign link (see Figure 1), it is also addressable by one or more 
care-of addresses, in addition to its home address. A care-of 
address is an IP address associated with a mobile node while 
visiting a particular foreign link. The subnet prefix of the mobile 
node’s care-of address is the subnet prefix on the foreign link 
being visited by the node. A mobile node typically acquires its 
care-of address through stateless [4] or stateful (e. g., DHCPv6, 
[5]) address autoconfiguration. While on the foreign link, the 
mobile node registers its care-of address with its home agent by 
sending a Binding Update message to the agent. The home agent 
thereafter uses proxy Neighbor Discovery to intercept any IPv6 
packets addressed to the mobile node’s home address on the home 
link, and tunnels each intercepted packet to the mobile node’s 
care-of address. To tunnel intercepted packets, the home agent 
encapsulates the packets using IPv6 encapsulation, with the outer 
IPv6 header addressed to the mobile node’s care-of address. 
A mobile node may at any time initiate route optimization 
operations with a correspondent node, allowing the correspondent 
node communicate directly with the mobile node, avoiding 
delivering traffic via the mobile node’s home agent. The binding 
update mechanism is also used by correspondent nodes to 
dynamically learn and cache the mobile node’s current binding. 
When sending a packet to the mobile node, a correspondent node 
checks its cached bindings for an entry for the packet’s 
destination address. If a cached binding for this destination 
address is found, the node uses an IPv6 Routing Header [6] to 
route the packet to the mobile node by way of the care-of address 
indicated in this binding. If, instead, the correspondent node has 
no cached binding for this destination address, the node sends the 
packet normally (i.e., to the mobile node’s home address with no 
routing header), and the packet is subsequently intercepted and 
tunneled to the mobile node by its home agent as described above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Basic operation in MIPv6. 
2.2 Redirect Attacks 
In the present paper we focus on redirect attacks and their 
countermeasures in MIPv6. We will not consider security issues 
such as data confidentiality, data integrity and user authentication 
since they are beyond the scope of MIPv6 and can be provided, 
for example, by IPsec or layers above IP. We classify redirect 
attacks in MIPv6 into two categories, Session Hijacking and 
Malicious Mobile Node Flooding, as depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)    (b) 
 
Figure 2. Redirect Attacks:  (a) Session Hijacking;  (b) 
Malicious Mobile Node Flooding. 
 
1. Session Hijacking: In the session hijacking redirect attack 
shown in Figure 2(a), we assume that a mobile node MN1 is 
communicating with a correspondent node CN. An intruder 
sends a forged binding update message (or replays an old 
binding update message) to CN, claiming that MN1 has 
moved to a new care-of address belonging to a node MN2. If 
CN accepts the fake binding update, it will start 
communicating with MN2 instead of MN1. This is an 
“outsider” attack since the intruder tries to redirect other 
nodes’ traffic. Such an attack may result in information 
leakage, impersonation of the mobile node MN1 or flooding 
of MN2. 
MN1 CN
Intruder
MN2
 Victim 
 CN2
Intruder
CN1
           Internet 
 Tunnel 
MN HA
CN 
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2. Malicious Mobile Node Flooding: In the malicious mobile 
node flooding attack depicted in Figure 2(b), an intruder, i.e., 
a malicious mobile node, sends valid binding update 
messages to its correspondent nodes CN1 and CN2, claiming 
that it has moved to the Victim’s location. Here the Victim 
can be either a node or a network. For example, the intruder 
could initiate requests to video streaming servers, and flood 
the Victim’s node or network by redirecting traffic from the 
video servers to the Victim. This attack is an “insider” attack 
since the malicious mobile node is a legitimate mobile node 
in its home link and its actions are “legal” binding update 
operations. 
We note that, instead of targeting at correspondent nodes, the 
above attacks apply equally to home agents of mobile nodes. By 
sending forged or malicious binding update messages to a mobile 
node’s home agent, an intruder can redirect traffic intended to the 
mobile node to a location of its choice. 
2.3 Security Assumptions 
We will make more or less the same security assumptions on 
MIPv6 as stated in [2]: 
1. Pre-established security association between a mobile node 
and its home agent: Mobile nodes and home agents know 
each other, and can thus have a pre-established strong 
security association to reliably authenticate exchanged 
messages between them. IPsec’s Encapsulating Security 
Payload (ESP) [7] is used to set up a secure tunnel between a 
mobile node and its home agent.  
2. No pre-established security association between a mobile 
node and a random correspondent node: It is expected that 
MIPv6 will be used on a global basis between nodes 
belonging to different administrative domains, hence 
building a global authentication infrastructure to authenticate 
mobile nodes and random correspondent nodes would be a 
very demanding task, at least in the near to medium terms. 
However, this does not rule out the possibility of having 
fragmented authentication infrastructures within individual 
administration domains or even cross different domains. 
Furthermore, making a traditional authentication 
infrastructure to keep track of correct IP addresses for all 
hosts is either impossible or at least very hard due to the 
dynamic association between IP addresses and hosts. 
Since a pre-established security association between a mobile 
node and its home agent is assumed, securing the binding update 
messages from a mobile node to its home agent is straightforward. 
Hence, during the rest of the paper, we will work on securing 
binding updates from mobile nodes to corresponding nodes. 
2.4 Cryptographic Notation 
We list below the cryptographic notation used throughout the 
paper for ease of reference: 
h() : a cryptographic secure one-way hash function, or 
one-way hash function in short, such as MD5 [8] 
and SHA [9]. 
prf(k, m) : a keyed pseudo random function – often a keyed 
hash function [10]. It accepts a secret key k and a 
message m, and generates a pseudo random output. 
This function is used for both generation of message 
authentication codes and derivation of cryptographic 
keys.  
PX/SX : a public and private key pair of node X in a digital 
signature scheme such as RSA [11] or DSS [12]. 
SX(m) : node X’s digital signature on a message m or on the 
hash of m. 
m|n : concatenation of two messages m and n. 
3. IETF’S SECURE BINDING UPDATE 
PROTOCOLS 
In this section we describe and analyze two protocols for 
authenticating binding update messages. The Return Routability 
(RR) protocol appeared in [2] and the Cryptographic Generated 
Address (CGA) protocol was under discussion by the working 
group according to [13]. 
3.1 The RR Protocol and Its Analysis 
Protocol Operation: In this protocol, each correspondent node 
CN keeps a secret key kCN and generates a nonce Nj at regular 
intervals, say every few minutes. CN uses the same key kCN and 
nonce Nj with all the mobile nodes it is in communication with, so 
that it does not need to generate and store a new nonce when a 
new mobile node contacts it. CN keeps both the current value of 
Nj and a small set of previous nonce values, Nj-1, Nj-2, … . Older 
values are discarded, and messages using them will be rejected as 
replays. Message exchanges in the RR protocol are shown in 
Figure 3, where the HoTI (Home Test Init) and CoTI (Care-of 
Test Init) messages are sent by the mobile node MN 
simultaneously. The HoT (Home Test) and CoT (Care-of Test) are 
replies from CN. All the RR protocol messages are sent as IPv6 
“Mobility Header” in IPv6 packets. In the representation of a 
protocol message, we will use the first two fields to denote source 
IP address and destination IP address, respectively. We will 
misuse the notation CN to let it denote the correspondent node as 
well as its IP address. 
MN                  HA                      CN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Return Routability Protocol. 
When MN wants to perform route optimization, it sends 
HoTI = {HoA, CN, rH} 
and 
CoTI = {CoA, CN, rC} 
to CN, where rH and rC are random values used to match 
responses with requests. HoTI tells MN’s home address HoA to 
HoTI
CoTI
HoT 
CoT 
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CN. It is reverse tunneled through the home agent HA, while CoTI 
informs MN’s care-of address CoA and is sent directly to CN. 
When CN receives HoTI, it takes the source IP address of HoTI as 
input and generates a home cookie 
CH = prf(kCN, HoA|Nj) 
and replies MN with 
HoT = {CN, HoA, rH, CH, j}, 
where the index j is carried along to allow CN later efficiently 
finding the nonce value Nj that it used in creating cookie CH. 
Similarly, when CN receives CoTI, it takes the source IP address 
of CoTI as input and generates a care-of cookie 
CC = prf(kCN, CoA|Ni) 
and sends 
CoT ={CN, CoA, rC, CC, i} 
to MN. Note that HoT is sent via MN’s home agent HA while CoT 
is delivered directly to MN. When MN receives both HoT and 
CoT, it hashes together the two cookies to form a session key 
kBU = h(CH|CC), 
which is then used to authenticate the binding update message to 
CN: 
BU = {CoA, CN, HoA, Seq#, LT, i, j, MACBU}, 
where Seq# is a sequence number used to detect replay attack, LT 
is the proposed lifetime of the binding, and 
MACBU = prf(kBU, CoA|CN|HoA|Seq#|LT|i|j) 
is a message authentication code (MAC) protected by the session 
key kBU. MACBU is used to ensure that BU was sent by the same 
node which received the HoT and CoT messages. The message 
BU contains j and i, so that CN knows which nonce values Nj and 
Ni to use to first re-compute CH and CC and then the session key 
kBU. Note that CN is stateless until it receives BU and verifies 
MACBU. If MACBU is verified positive, CN may reply with a 
binding acknowledgement message 
BA = {CN, CoA, HoA, Seq#, LT’, MACBA}, 
where Seq# is copied from the BU message, LT’ is the granted 
lifetime, and 
MACBA = prf(kBU, CN|CoA|HoA|Seq#|LT’) 
is a MAC generated using kBU to authenticate the BA message. CN 
then creates a binding cache entry for the mobile node MN. The 
binding cache entry binds HoA with CoA which allows future 
packets to MN be sent to CoA directly. 
An example implementation of the binding cache at CN is shown 
in Figure 4, where HoA is used as an index for searching the 
binding cache for the destination address of a packet being sent, 
r_LT is the remaining lifetime for this entry, and the sequence 
number Seq# is used by CN to sequence binding updates and by 
MN to match a return binding acknowledgement with a binding 
update. Each binding update sent by MN must use a Seq# greater 
than (modulo 216) the one sent in the previous binding update by 
the same HoA. It is no requirement, however, that the sequence 
number value strictly increase by 1 with each new binding update 
sent or received [2]. Note that the session key kBU is not kept in 
the cache entry. When MN receives a binding update message, 
based on the nonce indexes i and j in the message, it re-computes 
the session key using kCN and the list of the most recent nonce 
values, say {Nj, Nj-1, Nj-2}, and then verifies BU using the newly 
computed session key. 
The mobile node MN maintains a Binding Update List for each 
binding update message sent by it, for which the lifetime has not 
yet expired. A binding update list for a correspondent node CN 
consists of CN’s IP address, MN’s home address HoA and care-of 
address CoA, the remaining lifetime of the binding, the maximum 
value of the sequence number sent in previous binding updates to 
CN and the session key kBU. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A binding cache implementation at CN in the RR 
protocol. 
Discussion: In the RR protocol, the two cookie exchanges verify 
that a mobile node MN is alive at its home address HoA and care-
of address CoA, respectively. The eventual binding update 
messages are protected using a keyed hash with the session key 
kBU obtained by hashing the concatenation of the two cookies CH 
and CC. Therefore, security of the binding update messages hinges 
on the secret sharing of kBU between MN and CN, which in turn 
hinges on the secrecy of at least one of the two cookies.  
The IETF MIPv6 documents [2, 3] stated that the motivation for 
designing the RR protocol was to have sufficient support for 
mobile IP, without creating major new security problems. It was 
not the goal of the Mobile IP Working Group to protect against 
attacks that were already possible before the introduction of IP 
mobility. The protocol does not defend against an intruder who 
can monitor the CN-HA path. The argument was that such 
intruders would in any case be able to mount an active attack 
against MN when it is at its home location. 
However, the design principle of the RR protocol, i.e., defending 
against intruder who can monitor the CN-MN path but not the CN-
HA path, is fundamentally flawed since it violates the well known 
“weakest link” principle in security. After all, one has no reason 
to assume that an intruder will monitor one link and not the other, 
especially when the intruder knows that monitoring a given link is 
particularly effective to expedite its attack. While it is true that 
intruders are able to mount active attacks when a node is at home 
in the base IPv6, we demonstrate below that it is much easier to 
launch redirect attacks in MIPv6 than in the base IPv6.  
First, let’s consider the session hijacking attack shown in Figure 
2(a). In the case of the base IPv6 without mobility (which is 
equivalent to the mobile node MN at its home link in MIPv6), to 
succeed in the attack, the intruder must be constantly present on 
the CN-HA path. In order to redirect CN’s traffic intended for MN 
to a malicious node, the intruder most likely has to get control of a 
router or a switch along the CN-HA path. Furthermore, after 
taking over the session from MN, if the malicious node wants to 
Entry for MN:  HoA,  CoA,  r_LT, Seq# 
                                                                      kCN, Nj, Nj-1, Nj-2
Entries for other mobile nodes 
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continue the session with CN while pretending to be MN, the 
malicious node and the router need to collaborate throughout the 
session. For example, the router tunnels CN’s traffic to the 
malicious node and vise versa. 
In the case of MIPv6, the effort committed to break the RR 
protocol to launch a session hijacking attack could be 
considerably lesser. Assume that MN1 and CN in Figure 2(a) are 
having an on-going communication session and the intruder wants 
to redirect CN’s traffic to his collaborator MN2. The intruder 
monitors the CN-HA path (i.e., anywhere from MN1’s home 
network to CN’s network) to obtain HoT, extracts the home 
cookie CH and sends it MN2. Upon receiving CH, MN2 sends a 
CoTI  to CN and CN will reply with a care-of cookie CC. MN2 
simply hashes the two cookies to obtain a valid session key, and 
uses the key to send a binding update message to CN on behalf of 
MN1. The binding update will be accepted by CN which will in 
turn direct its traffic to MN2.  
Next, consider the malicious mobile node flooding attack shown 
in Figure 2(b). In the base IPv6 without mobility, perhaps the best 
example of flooding attack is the DDoS attack in which a 
multitude of compromised systems attack a single target. There 
are many ways to launch a malicious mobile node flooding attack 
against a victim (which can be either a node or a network) in 
MIPv6. For example, the malicious node starts some traffic 
intensive sessions with correspondent nodes and moves to the 
victim’s network or the border between the victim network and 
the outside world. It then runs the RR protocol to redirect traffic 
from the correspondent nodes to the victim’s network by sending 
them binding update messages. The malicious mobile node does 
not need any special software or networking skill to launch this 
attack. 
Due to the stateless nature of the RR protocol, it is easy for an 
intruder to cause havoc to, say B2C operations. Imagine a 
correspondent node provides on-line services to many mobile 
clients. The intruder can simply eavesdrop on the RR protocol 
messages to collect cookies on the border between the 
correspondent node and the Internet. The intruder then randomly 
hashes pairs of cookies to form session keys, and sends binding 
update messages to the correspondent node. This will cause 
redirection of traffic to randomly selected mobile clients and 
eventually bring down the services of the correspondent node. 
Finally, we point out that the IETF MIPv6 specification limits the 
lifetime of a RR authorized binding to a maximum of 420 seconds 
[2]. This will have performance implications. Imagine having a 
time sensitive session between a mobile node and a correspondent 
node where the mobile node must perform the RR protocol every 
420 seconds or less. Quality of communication will definitely 
suffer if the RR protocol cannot be executed in a timely manner 
due to congestion or malfunction of the home agent, home link or 
the CN-HA path. 
3.2 The CGA Protocol and Its Analysis 
The Cryptographic Generated Address (CGA) protocol for secure 
binding update, first proposed in [14], is under discussion in the 
IETF Mobile IP Working Group according to [13]. In IPv6, a 
128-bit IP address is divided into a subnet prefix and an interface 
identifier. The home addresses of all the mobile nodes associated 
with a home link share the same home link subnet prefix and are 
differentiated by their unique interface identifiers. 
Protocol Operation: Each mobile node MN has a public/private 
key pair PMN and SMN in a digital signature scheme. MN’s home 
address is given by HoA = {HL|II}, where HL is the n-bit home 
link subnet prefix and II is the (128-n)-bit interface identifier. The 
II field is obtained by taking the left-most (128-n) bits of the hash 
function output h(PMN). A binding update message from MN to a 
correspondent node CN is given by 
BU = {CN, CoA, HoA, Seq#, LT, PMN, 128-n, SIGMN}, 
where  
SIGMN = SMN(CoA|CN|HoA|Seq#|LT|PMN|128-n) 
is MN’s digital signature generated using its private key SMN. 
Upon receiving the BU, CN computes h(PMN) , compares the left 
most (128-n) bits of h(PMN) with the right most (128-n)-bit II in 
HoA, and verifies the signature using the public key PMN. If the 
hash value matches the value of II and if the signature verification 
is positive, CN will accept the binding update message. 
Discussion: The hash function h() here acts as a “one-to-one” 
mapping from a public key value to an interface identifier; it binds 
a public key value with an interface identifier. Since it is 
computationally hard to either find the private key or forge a 
digital signature given the public key, a match of h(PMN) with II in 
HoA as well as positive verification of the signature on BU proves 
that BU was generated by the mobile node whose interface 
identifier portion is II and who knows the private key SMN. This is 
the only assurance a correspondent node gets from BU. As a 
consequence, the protocol is able to provide good protection 
against the session hijacking attack provided the number of bits in 
II, (128-n), is large enough. If (128-n) is small, an intruder can 
randomly generate pairs of public and private keys, hash the 
public keys and look for a match to a target node’s II. Once a 
match is found, the intruder is able to impersonate the target node 
and forge binding updates. The computational complexity of this 
brute force attack is on the order of o(2(128-n)). 
On the other hand, since this protocol does not provide any proof 
on the authorization of MN to use the particular HoA, it is not able 
to protect against the malicious mobile node flooding attacks. 
Actually, an intruder can just generate a public/private key pair, 
hashes the public key to form a home address, signs a binding 
update message which contains a victim’s address as CoA, and 
sends it to a correspondent node. The correspondent node will 
accept the binding update and start sending traffic to flood the 
victim node. 
The CGA protocol is computational intensive since every binding 
update message requires the mobile node to generate a digital 
signature and the correspondent node perform a verification of 
digital signature. 
4. OUR SECURE BINDING UPDATE 
PROTOCOL 
Our protocol employs public key cryptosystems in order to 
provide strong security and good scalability. There are two 
important design considerations in protocols using public key 
cryptosystems. The first is performance since public key 
cryptosystem operations are computationally intensive. Portable 
devices with constraint computational power, such as PDAs and 
cellular phones, are predicted to account for a majority or at least 
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a substantial fraction of the population of mobile devices. It is 
crucial to keep the amount of public key cryptosystem operations 
in mobile devices to the absolute minimum. 
The second consideration is the mechanism used to securely bind 
a subject’s name with its public key since they have significant 
impact on the entire system architecture and operation. Such a 
binding is typically achieved using public key certificates issued 
by a trusted certification authority, or CA in short. A public key 
certificate at the minimum consists of a subject’s name, its public 
key, valid time interval and CA’s digital signature on the above 
data items. In the MIPv6 environment, a mobile node could be 
issued a public key certificate with its home address as the 
subject’s name. However, having public key certificates with IP 
addresses as subject’s names is a bad practice for several reasons. 
First, IP addresses are often obtained by DNS (Directory Name 
Service) look-up and DNS does not provide a secure way of 
mapping names to IP addresses. Second, IP addresses are subject 
to renumbering both when service providers change and when 
configurations change so they may not be as persistent as other 
subject names (e.g., domain names) [15]. Third, IP addresses are 
leased to an interface for a fixed length of time. When an IP 
address’s lease time expires, the association of the address with 
the interface becomes invalid and the address may be reassigned 
to another interface elsewhere in the Internet. There might be 
various reasons for keeping IP addresses’ lease time short, such as 
for privacy protection. For devices which functions as client 
devices, reference [16] recommends to change their IP addresses 
periodically to prevent eavesdroppers and other information 
collectors from correlating the clients’ seemingly unrelated 
activities over an extended period of time. Therefore, it is very 
difficult in practice for CAs to keep track of correct associations 
between IP addresses and all devices’ interfaces in a consistent 
and timely manner, not to mention issuing and revoking public 
key certificates for them. 
Subnet prefixes for home links, however, are much more trackable 
and manageable. First, a home link subnet prefix is normally 
much more persistent than a mobile node’s home address. Second, 
the number of home links is significantly smaller than the number 
of mobile nodes. Third, subnet prefixes are managed by system 
administration staff who can do a much better job in keeping track 
prefix changes than keeping track of which IP address is 
associated with which individual mobile node. 
Motivated by the above observations, our protocol is designed to 
possess the following features: 
1. It performs one-way authenticated key-exchange between 
MN and CN where MN authenticates itself to CN and the 
exchanged session key is used to secure binding update 
messages from MN to CN. 
2. It employs public key cryptosystems and is secure against 
powerful adversary who is able to launch both passive (e.g., 
eavesdropping at multiple points) and active (e.g., man-in-
the-middle) attacks. 
3. It is easy to manage and scalable. Instead of issuing public 
key certificates containing home addresses as subject names 
for individual mobile nodes, we issue public key certificates 
containing home link subnet prefixes as subject names for 
home links. 
4. No public key cryptographic operations are performed at 
mobile nodes. MIPv6 assumes that home agents are trusted 
by mobile nodes as well as correspondent nodes and that 
communications between mobile nodes and their home 
agents are protected with pre-established security 
associations; home agents function as trusted security proxies 
for mobile nodes in the protocol. They testify the legitimacy 
of mobile nodes’ home addresses, facilitate authentication of 
mobile nodes to correspondent nodes, and establish shared 
secret session keys for them. 
System Setup: A home link is associated with a public/private 
key pair PH and SH in a digital signature scheme. The private key 
SH is kept by a home agent HA in the home link, probably inside 
in a tamper-resistant hardware cryptographic processing device. 
The home link obtains a public key certificate, 
CertH = {HL, PH, VI, SIGCA} 
from a certification authority CA, where HL is the home link 
subnet prefix, VI is the valid duration of the certificate, and SIGCA 
is CA’s signature on HL, PH and VI. We assume correspondent 
nodes can obtain CA’s public key via various means, such as by 
embedding or configuring CA’s public key into MIPv6 
implementations. Embedding CAs’ public keys has been the 
approach in the tremendously successful SSL/TLS protocol [15], 
where popular browsers embed dozens of public key values of 
well-known CAs. The protocol also uses the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange algorithm to arrive at a mutual secret value between 
parties of the protocol. Let p and g be the public Diffie-Hellman 
parameters, where p is a large prime and g is a generator of the 
multiplicative group Zp*. To keep our notation compact, we will 
write gx mod p simply as gx.  Since generation of large primes in 
real time can be very time consuming, we assume that the values 
of p and g are agreed upon before hand by all the parties 
concerned. 
Protocol Operation: As in the RR protocol, all the protocol 
messages here are carried within IPv6 “Mobility Header” which 
allows protocol messages to be piggybacked on any existing IPv6 
packets. The protocol messages exchanged among a mobile node 
MN, its home agent HA and its correspondent node CN are shown 
in Figure 5. In the protocol, the existence of and operations 
performed by HA are transparent to both MN and CN. As far as 
MN is concerned, it sends message REQ to and receives REP from 
CN. Similarly, from CN’s point of view, it receives COOKIE0, 
EXCH0 and CONFIRM from and sends COOKIE1 and EXCH1 to 
MN. 
The use of cookies during the key exchange is a weak form of 
protection against an intruder who generates a series of request 
packets, each with a different spoofed source IP address and sends 
them to a protocol party. For each request, the protocol party will 
first validate cookies before performing computationally 
expensive public key cryptographic operations. For details on 
cookie generation and validation, please refer to [17]. 
As before, the first two fields in a protocol message are the source 
IP address and destination IP address, respectively. When MN 
wants to start route optimization operation with CN, it sends a 
route optimization request 
REQ = {HoA, CN, n0} 
to CN via reserve tunneling, where n0 is a nonce value used to 
match the reply message REP. Here we use CN to represent both 
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the correspondent node and its IP address. Message REQ is sent 
to MN’s home link via the IPsec protected secure tunnel. IPsec 
provides replay protection only when dynamic security 
association establishment is used. This may not always be 
possible and manual keying might be preferred in certain 
circumstances. For this reason, we have included n0 to counter 
message replay. Upon arriving at the home link, REQ is 
intercepted by HA using IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [2, 18]. HA 
will not forward REQ to CN, instead, it creates a cookie C0 and 
sends 
 
MN               HA            CN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Message exchange in our new protocol. 
 
COOKIE0 = {HoA, CN, C0} 
to CN. In reply, CN creates a nonce n1 and a cookie C1, and sends 
COOKIE1 = {CN, HoA, C0, C1, n1} 
to MN. Note that the destination address in COOKIE1 is MN’s 
home address HoA. As a result, this message is delivered to MN’s 
home link and intercepted by HA using IPv6 Neighbor Discovery. 
After receiving COOKIE1, HA checks on the validity of C0, 
generates a nonce n2 and a Diffie-Hellman secret value x < p, 
computes its Diffie-Hellman public value gx and its signature 
SIGH = SH(HoA|CN|gx| n1| n2|TS) 
using home link’s private key SH, where TS is a time stamp. This 
time stamp does not have to be checked by the recipient during 
the message exchange. It will be used to trace back the culprit 
should a malicious mobile node flooding attack have occurred. 
This point will be made clearer later.  Finally, HA replies CN with 
EXCH0 = {HoA, CN, C0, C1, n1, n2, gx, TS, SIGH, CertH}, 
where CertH = {HL, PH, VI, SIGCA} is the public key certificate of 
the home link as defined before. Note that the values of n1 and n2 
are included in the signature SIGH in order to counter reply of old 
signatures and to resist chosen message attacks to the signature 
scheme, respectively. 
When CN receives EXCH0, it validates the cookies, the home 
link’s public key certificate CertH, the signature and importantly, 
checks for equality of the home link subnet prefix strings 
embedded in both CertH and HoA. If all the validations and 
checking are positive, CN can be confident that the home address 
HoA of MN is authorized by its home link and the Diffie-Hellman 
public vaule gx is freshly generated by MN’s home link. CN next 
generates its Diffie-Hellman secret value y < p. It then computes 
its Diffie-Hellman public value gy, the Diffie-Hellman  key kDH = 
(gx)y, a session key 
kBU = prf(kDH, n1|n2) 
and a MAC 
MAC1 = prf(kBU, gy|EXCH0), 
and sends 
EXCH1 = {CN, HoA, C0, C1, gy, MAC1} 
to MN. Again, this message is intercepted by HA, which first 
validates the cookies, calculates the Diffie-Hellman key kDH = 
(gy)x and the session key kBU = prf(kDH, n1|n2). HA then computes 
MAC2 = prf(kBU, EXCH1), 
and sends 
CONFIRM  = {HoA, CN, MAC2} 
to CN.  The validity of MAC2 is checked by CN and if it is valid, 
CN creates a cache entry for HoA and the session key kBU, which 
will be used for authenticating binding update messages from MN. 
Upon positive verification of MAC1, HA also sends 
REP = {CN, HoA, n0, kBU} 
to MN through the secure IPsec ESP protected tunnel. After 
receiving REP, MN checks that n0 is the same as the one it sent 
out in REQ. If so, MN proceeds to send CN binding update 
messages protected using kBU as in the RR protocol. It should be 
noted that the CONFIRM message serves to confirm the key to 
CN and hence is optional. 
Discussion: With a straightforward informal analysis it is easy to 
show that the above protocol performs a strong one-way 
authentication of MN/HoA to CN and provides CN with the 
confidence that it shares a secret session key with MN. A formal 
analysis of the protocol is beyond scope of the paper. Here we just 
would like to point out that the most important message is 
EXCH0.  Recall that after receiving EXCH0, CN checks on the 
equality of the home link subnet prefix contained in both CertH 
and HoA. This check is critical to detect man-in-the-middle attack. 
The signature SIGH = SH(HoA|CN|gx|n1|n2|TS) serves two 
purposes. First, it certifies that the Diffie-Hellman value gx was 
originated by MN’s home agent HA on behalf of MN and second, 
it testifies that HoA is under HA’s (or equivalently the home 
link’s) jurisdiction and is a legitimate home address for its mobile 
node MN. This authenticates MN’s HoA to CN. 
Since a successful completion of the protocol allows CN to 
authenticate MN’s HoA as well as allows the two nodes to set up a 
secret session key for securing binding updates, the protocol 
prevents the session hijacking attack shown in Figure 2(a). This 
protocol, as any other protocols, is not able to completely prevent 
malicious mobile node flooding attacks.  However, if a 
correspondent node were blamed to have bombarded a network 
service or site, it could present the signature SIGH = 
SH(HoA|CN|gx|n1|n2|TS)  and point its fingers at the home agent 
HA. HA can subsequently nail down the mobile node MN which 
had a home address HoA and performed a binding update at the 
time specified by TS. 
In our protocol, mobile nodes are not required to perform any 
public key cryptographic operations but correspondent nodes are. 
REQ 
REP 
 COOKIE0 
 COOKIE1 
EXCH0 
EXCH1 
COMFIRM 
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Public key cryptographic operations may not a great concern if a 
correspondent node is a server machine. However, a 
correspondent node can also be a mobile node with limited 
computational power and battery life. In this case, public key 
operations supposed to be performed by the correspondent code 
can be off-loaded to its home agent. This scenario is depicted in 
Figure 6, where HAMN and HACN  are the the home agents of MN 
and CN, respectively. Since in MIPv6 it is assumed that a mobile 
node has a pre-established security association with its home 
agent, it is natural in our protocol to have HAMN and HACN 
perform public key cryptographic operations on behalf of MN and 
CN, respectively. Also due to the symmetric arrangement of the 
entities, it is possible to perform a mutual authenticated key-
exchange between MN and CN and establish session keys to 
secure binding updates messages in both directions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Scenario where CN is a mobile node. 
 
Since our protocol uses strong cryptosystems, the secret session 
key kBU established from the protocol could be used for a long 
period of time. This is in contrast to the RR protocol, where the 
protocol must be executed at least every 420 seconds even if the 
mobile node stays at the same foreign location. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Mobile IP allows mobile nodes to have seamless communications 
when they change their point of attachment in the Internet and is 
poised to take off in a big way in the not too distant future. 
However, introduction of mobility into IP also brought with it 
new security issues and attacks, among them redirect attacks are 
perhaps the ones need the most urgent attention. 
In this paper, we first classified redirect attacks into two types. In 
the first type of attacks -Session Hijacking attacks, an intruder 
hijacks an existing session between a mobile node and a 
correspondent node and redirects the correspondent node’s traffic 
to a malicious location.  In the second type of attacks - Malicious 
Mobile Node Flooding attacks, a mischievous mobile node sets up 
communication sessions with correspondent nodes, and then 
redirect traffic from the correspondent nodes to flood a victim 
node or network. 
Next we reviewed and analyzed two protocols, the RR protocol 
and the CGA protocol, as proposed by the IETF Mobile IP 
Working Group. We showed that both protocols could be broken 
quite easily and are virtually not much use in defending redirect 
attacks. 
We then proposed a new protocol to guard against redirect 
attacks. Our protocol makes use of a digital signature scheme and 
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. An important 
contribution of our protocol is that we issue public key certificates 
for home links based on home link subnet prefixes, instead of 
issuing public key certificates for each and every mobile nodes 
based on their individual home addresses. We argued that such an 
approach makes certificate issuing, tracking, and revocation much 
more practical and manageable. In our protocol, a home agent 
functions as security proxy for its mobile nodes and testifies the 
legitimacy of a mobile node’s home address to a correspondent 
node during protocol execution. Recognizing that most mobile 
nodes are constrained in processing power and battery life and 
that home agents can be easily equipped with increasingly low 
cost yet powerful cryptographic processing hardware accelerators, 
the protocol was designed to off load all the expensive public key 
cryptosystem operations from mobile nodes to their home agents. 
We showed that our protocol is secure against session hijacking 
attack. In addition, it is also capable of providing evidence to 
trace back the culprit should a malicious mobile node flooding 
attack has occurred. 
The validity of the RR protocol authorized bindings is limited to a 
maximum of 420 seconds [2]. Consequently, a mobile node and a 
correspondent node need to perform the protocol once at least 
every 7 minutes. This introduces periodic overheads for the 
mobile and correspondent nodes and may degrade communication 
quality (such as introducing jitters in time sensitive 
communication sessions) due to congestion or slow response of 
the home agent. The CGA protocol requires a mobile node to 
generate a digital signature for every binding update it sends and 
the correspondent node to verify the signature for every binding 
update it receives. This could be a substantial computational 
burden if the mobile node moves quickly from one subnet to 
another. In our approach, the protocol needs just be performed 
once, say at the starting point of a communication session 
between a mobile node and a correspondent node. The secret 
session key resulted from the protocol execution can be used for 
authenticating binding updates for a relatively long period of time, 
say, throughout a communication session. 
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